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This paper examines to what extent macroprudential policies in the Turkish banking sector affected
the functioning of depositor discipline. Our results suggest that depositors’ responses for poor bank
performance get stronger after the 2008 crisis, when various macroprudential measures were
implemented to preserve financial stability. In the aftermath of the crisis, bank behavior toward
depositors also alters. Ahead of the crisis, banks did not significantly respond to the discipline
exerted by depositors, however, banks begin offering higher rates to curb deposit withdrawals
afterwards. Our findings suggest that the implementation of macroprudential tools seem to have a
positive impact on financial stability, since, in the post-2008 period, regulatory supervision have been
more firmly assisted by the market.
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis that peaked in 2008 significantly changed the modus operandi of
monetary policy (Di Giorgio, 2014). It has been a common trend in advanced economies
to adopt accommodative monetary policies in the form of low policy rates and generous
liquidity support (Claessens et al., 2010; Leaven and Valencia, 2010). Even though these
measures have been relatively successful in relieving the uncertainties in the aftermath
of the Lehman’s collapse, the tendency toward excessive risk-taking has created other
concerns. Against the backdrop of low rates, tightened credit spreads and record-low
volatilities, macroprudential policies have been accepted as a desirable antidote to the
growing worries that sustained low rates will eventually lead to financial instability
(De Nicolò et al., 2012; Claessens et al., 2013; Hasan et al., 2013). This perspective
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suggests that macroprudential policies are effective to tame the credit cycle, increasing the
likelihood that we have entered after a sustained period of lower structural volatility.
The ultimate aim of accommodative monetary policies has been to enable easy and
cheap access to debt and equity financing. Further, unprecedented support from the central
banks, in the form of bond purchasing programs, have kept a lid on interest rates, and
nurtured the risk appetite of investors. Access to cheaper credit also encourages households
to spend more: the higher wealth levels caused by higher asset valuations encourage
households to spend a higher fraction of their income. It is however argued that
accommodative monetary policies have encouraged banks to take excessive risk (Calo-
miris, 2013; Claessens et al., 2013; Adrian and Liang, 2014). Ample liquidity at low rates
stimulates financial institutions to rebalance their portfolio holdings from risk-free assets
towards riskier, higher-yielding assets. The search for yield has mainly resulted in capital
flows to emerging economies, and many of these economies now strive to curb the
destabilizing effects of these flows on their domestic markets.1 Framing the goals of
monetary policy and macroprudential policies in this way exposes the conflict in between,
namely, that the former aims to encourage revitalizing the investment environment and
household spending while the latter aims to discourage excessive risk-taking and the
amplification of credit cycles.
From the perspective of current monetary policy goals, it is clear that monetary stimuli
leave the task of eliminating the risks to macroprudential policies. The implementation of
macroprudential policies on several issues calls for further tasks and moves macro-
prudential policies more squarely into the realm of regulatory and supervisory institutions.
Nonetheless, there is skepticism on the effectiveness of those policies in mitigating the
adverse effects of monetary policies. Using cross-country analyses, BIS (2014) puts evi-
dence that macroprudential measures, while useful to strengthen banks, have been unable
to completely restrain the build-up of financial imbalances, especially where monetary
conditions have remained accommodative. Likewise, in his speech Claudio Borio, Head of
the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS),
contends that expectations from macroprudential policies are too high and sometimes
optimistic. He defends the idea that macroprudential polices should be implemented with
appropriate monetary and fiscal policies, otherwise, he argues, macroprudential policies
may be inadequate to tame financial booms and busts (Borio, 2014).
Since there are both optimism and pessimism regarding the effectiveness of macro-
prudential policies, it can be argued that the support in favor of these policies will likely to
continue so for the foreseeable future given that growth concerns and financial stability
issues will remain fully unresolved. While the implementation of macroprudential policies
has already changed the scope of both central banking and regulatory practice, given the
1Inflation targeting has been adopted by many of emerging economies in the implementation of monetary policy before the
2008 financial crisis. Capital inflows to emerging economies weakened the efficacy of inflation targeting in policy imple-
mentation since the interest rate tool alone becomes ineffective to tame inflation. Policy rate hikes had been effective to curb
domestic demand before 2008 exacerbated inflation concerns through amplified capital inflows. Rapid credit growth as a
consequence of heightened capital inflows led to financial stability concerns (sec Borio and Lowe, 2002; IMF, 2011a, 2011b;
Ozkan and Unsal, 2014 for excellent discussions).
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limited experience, there is still room about comprehending the impact of macroprudential
policies. In contrast with the previous literature, we take a different approach by trying to
capture whether depositors’ sensitivities towards bank risk have changed along with
macroprudential measures. Most evidences suggest stronger depositor discipline during
crises due to depositors’ increased vulnerability to bank risk (Peria and Schmukler, 2001;
(Levy-Yeyati et al., 2004; Kraft and Galac, 2007). This study examines the direction to
which depositor discipline evolved in Turkey after the 2008 global financial crisis, the
period when the authority bodies have implemented macroprudential tools in order to
explicitly preserve the stability of the financial system.
Depositor discipline refers to a situation where depositors or other creditors reward or
punish banks for their performance (see e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga, 2004; Disli et al. 2013). This disciplining mechanism is considered to be
supplementary to regulatory supervision in the aim to promote a safer and more efficient
banking system. The deteriorating performance of banks causes withdrawals from banks and/
or forces banks to increase deposit rates to deter further withdrawals. Conversely, depositors
are ready to deposit their funds at lower rates if banks have better fundamentals. Depositor
discipline in principle leads to both price and quantity adjustments in bank liabilities, which,
in turn, would stimulate bank management to reduce risk-taking in order to attract deposits
(Park and Peristiani, 1998; Flannery, 1998; Peria and Schmukler, 2001).
Our results provide evidence that the depositors punish their banks for poor perfor-
mance in Turkey. The disciplinary role of depositors strengthens when the wake-up-call
effect of the 2008 crisis raises depositors’ vulnerability. The results also reveal that banks
only begin responding to deposit withdrawal in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. Overall,
we find that depositor discipline is exercised more sturdily as a response to the 2008 crisis.
We do not observe any easing impact on depositors’ responses toward bank risk stemming
from macroprudential policies. This relation also has its reflection in bank behavior. While
banks have benefitted from ample funding sources after the crisis, banks are notified about
their deteriorating fundamentals successfully in the aftermath of the crisis. This shows that
new funding sources have not completely eradicated the need for depositors’ money,
probably due to the fear of losing stake in deposit market. This is especially important
since macroprudential polices in the country aimed at reducing risk in the banking system
which can also be driven by the ample capital in the aftermath of the crisis.
We organize this paper as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief background and
review related work about the market discipline and also give guidance how the expan-
sionary policies can impact depositor discipline. In Section 3, we describe the sample of
banks and introduce the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results. In the last
section, we discuss our main findings and try to explain the reason behind some of them.
2. Literature Background
The positive stance to macroprudential policies has instigated central bankers and super-
visors to adopt diverse policy tools. The variety of instruments and options at central
banks’ disposal is crucial in gauging the potential policy responses to the changing global
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environment. In view of the increasing risk of price bubbles, various policies were targeted
to lending activities. In various countries, loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-servicing ratios
were lowered to limit the propensity to lend in many sectors (IMF, 2011a; 2011b; Lim
et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2013). The objective of these measures was to strengthen the
banking sector’s resilience against a severe adjustment in asset prices. Central banks and
supervisory agencies in some countries also put some minimum caps on the capital and
liquidity base of commercial banks. To support these policies, also financing restrictions
were imposed for loans to reduce the impact of ample liquidity on asset bubbles.
Country-specific cases provide rich insights (see Lim et al., 2011; Claessens, 2014).
The Monetary Authority in Singapore, for instance, has used macroprudential measures to
control asset price inflation to avoid a build-up of imbalances (Lim et al., 2011). Banks in
Singapore maintained cash balances in current accounts with the Monetary Authority of
Singapore to meet reserve requirements and settle interbank transactions. Banks were
required to maintain a minimum cash balance and a capital adequacy ratio. In addition, the
central bank imposes financing restrictions for loans, such as those for motor vehicles and
mortgages, and regulates credit facilities of financial institutions.
To improve risk management practices of banks in Hong Kong, the Monetary Authority
has introduced various rounds of countercyclical macroprudential measures since October
2009. The latest measures introduced on 22 February 2013 include increasing the upward
mortgage rate adjustment for stress testing property mortgage loan applicants’ debt-
servicing ability. The implementation of macroprudential policies to reduce the LTV ratios
seems to be successful. He (2014) reports that caps on LTV ratios have been effective in
constraining household leverage, but its effect on housing prices is not sustainable.
According to the Monetary Authority, the prudential measures implemented so far have
helped lower the actual LTV ratio for new mortgage from an average of 64% before the
policy measures to 55% recently, and the debt-servicing ratio from an average of over 40%
to a low of 35% in December 2013.
To curb the credit expansion in Thailand, the preferred instrument to control credit
expansion is setting the one-day repurchase rate consistent with the objective of achieving
the prescribed inflation target (Lim et al., 2011). It should be noted that state-owned
financial institutions have grown quickly in recent years as a response to the 2008 crisis,
and now reportedly account for 28% of banking assets in the system. Arguably, the rise of
these banks has diluted the Bank of Thailand’s overall control of credit expansion and its
oversight of the banking system.
The authorities in emerging market countries also put close scrutiny on credit institu-
tions. Among many others, China, Hungary, Romania and Mexico conduct policies related
to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial inter-
mediary system. In Turkey, the policymaking institutions have opted to use various
measures to manage short-term capital flows to the country in an unconventional monetary
policy framework (Aysan et al., 2014). Specifically, the Central Bank of Turkey has put
into implementation numerous macroprudential tools, such as required reserve ratios
(RRRs) and reserve option mechanism (ROM), to tame domestic credit growth (see Alper
et al., 2012; Akçelik et al., 2013; Ermisoglu et al., 2014; Aysan et al., 2015b). Table 1
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presents the details of macroprudential policies in the country in a chronological order. The
details of the descriptions provide the nature of the macroprudential policies. Related to
managing bank risk originating from capital inflows, RRRs were used actively between
4Q10 and 1Q13, first as part of the Central Bank’s exit strategy and then to encourage the
Table 1. Macroprudential Policies in Turkey
Measure Description Date
Dividend policy Requires banks to seek approval from the
Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency (BRSA) before distributing divi-
dends. The maximum dividend payout for
CAR>18% is 20%, for 18%<CAR<16% it
is 15% and for 13%<CAR<16% it is 10%.
October 2008; extended
in 2010 and 2011
Restrictions on FX
lending
Allows non-FX-earnings companies to bor-
row in FX from local banks (previously,
only FX-earning companies could borrow
FX), provided FX loan amount is greater
than US$5 million and maturity date is
longer than a year; bans consumers from
taking out FX-linked loans.
June 2009
LTV ceilings Implements LTV ceilings on housing loans to
consumer (at 75%) and on purchases of
commercial real estate (at 50%).
December 2010
Guidance to cap credit
growth
The authorities provided guidance to banks
that credit growth (adjusted for FX move-
ments) in 2011 should not exceed 25%.
Spring 2011
Higher risk weights for
consumer loans
Higher risk weights introduced for fast
growing consumer loans. For new general
purpose loans with maturities below 2
years, the capital adequacy risk weight is
increased to 150% (from 100%). For new
general purpose loans with a maturity
greater than 2 years, the risk weight is
increased to 200% (from 100%).
June 2011
Increased provisions for
consumer loans
For new (performing) general purpose stan-
dard loans (Group 1), general provisions
were increased from 1% to 4%. Specific
provisions for closely followed up loans
(Group 2) increased from 2% to 8%. The
higher provisioning requirements are for
banks having a consumer loan portfolio
exceeding 20% of total loans or having a
general purpose loan NPL greater than 8%.
If there is a restructuring of the loan
allowing maturity extension, a minimum of
10% provisioning is required.
June 2011
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Table 1. (Continued )
Measure Description Date
Limits to credit card
payments
If three or more monthly payments within a
calendar year are less than half of the
outstanding balance for the period, the
individual credit card limits cannot be
increased and cash advances for such credit
cards cannot be permitted, unless the
outstanding balance for the period is fully
covered.
June 2011
Changes to minimum
capital adequacy
requirements
Amended by the BRSA in September 2011 to
apply to banks with foreign strategic
shareholders as of January 2012. The
minimum ratio would depend on various
factors such as the CDS spread of the
parent and its sovereign, EBA stress test
results and the public debt ratio in the
country of origin.
September 2011
Some sectoral measures
for provisions
Determining higher provisions by the BRSA
taking into account the riskiness of the
particular sectors.
September 2012
Differentiation of tax
rate for interest
income of deposits
Amended by cabinet decision (1 January
2013) to differentiate 15% tax rate taken
from interest income of deposits according
to maturity of the deposit. New tax rates
are as follows: In TL deposits, rates are
15% for 6 months, 12% for 6–12 months
and 10% for more than 1 year. In FX
deposits, rates are 18% for 6 months, 15%
for 6–12 months and 13% for more than 1
year.
January 2013
Differentiation of
resource utilization
fund rates
Amended by cabinet decision (1 January
2013) to differentiate resource utilization
fund rates taken from credit users. New
rates are as follows: 3% for loans given for
less than 1 year, 1% for loans given for 1–2
years (before it was 0%), 0.5% for loans
given for 2–3 years (before it was 0%) and
0% for loans given for more than 3 years.
January 2013
Withdrawal from a time
deposit account
before maturity
Depositors can withdraw half of their time
deposits at most two times without losing
interest income if maturity of their account
is 1 year and longer. For cumulative de-
posit account, the same process is valid if
half of the amount is withdrawn at most
three times.
January 2013
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extension of the maturities of domestic currency deposits and discipline credit growth.
Likewise, ROM supports FX reserve management of the banking system to contain the
adverse effects of undesired capital flow volatility. The Central Bank, however, announced
in March 2014 that it is considering paying interest on required reserves in a measured way
to support banks’ profitability given slowing loan growth. The BRSA will step-in if more
decisive regulatory action is needed to slow credit growth. The increased risk weightings
and higher provisioning for consumer loans in 2011 proved effective in slowing credit
growth, and another macroprudential tightening in consumer loans and credit cards went
into force in February 2014. As a more direct impact on depositor discipline, the country
increased the level of deposit insurance up to 100,000 Turkish Liras in a bid to encourage
more savings. This level was 50,000 Turkish Liras in 2004 after the implementation of an
effective banking reform as a consequence of the 2001 domestic banking debacle.
Against the background of macroprudential policies worldwide, we aim to contribute to
the strand of literature whether or not macroprudential policies in Turkey have helped to
relieve the tension between depositors and banks. Among the papers in this part of liter-
ature, (Opiela, 2004) finds that in the 18-month period directly preceding the 1997 crisis of
Thailand, the disciplining role of depositors have been closer indicating that depositors’
motivation did not show drastic changes. Peria and Schmukler (2001) show that in Latin
American countries, deposit growth rates and deposit interest costs have been more sen-
sitive to bank risks in post-crisis periods, which is known as the wake-up-call effect (Hasan
et al., 2013). Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004) note that during the crisis periods that occurred in
Argentina and Uruguay, macroeconomic shocks have been the main concerns for
depositors whereas depositors’ sensitivities to bank-specific factors weakened significantly.
Kraft and Galac (2007) show that during the crisis of Croatia during 1998–1999,
Table 1. (Continued )
Measure Description Date
Leverage, capital
buffers and capital
adequacy
BRSA has issued several regulations within
the framework of the harmonization
process for Basel III on leverage, capital
conservation and countercyclical capital
buffers.
January 2014
Measures on credit card
usage and consumer
loans
The scope of the incremental provision ratios
increased for consumer loans.
January 2014
Risk weights of receivables from credit cards
and long-term automobile loans that were
used in calculating capital adequacy ratios
were increased. The minimum payment
ratio for credit cards increased, card limits
reduced for the first time users and lower
income group.
Source: BRSA, Central Bank of Turkey and government sources.
Financial Crisis, Macroprudential Policies and Depositor Discipline 11
depositors’ vulnerability to interest rates completely disappeared confirming the existence
of flight-to-quality concerns. In a similar vein, Hosono (2005) does not confirm the impact
of crisis on depositor discipline. The author demonstrates that the vulnerability of deposits
and deposit cost actually declined in South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand after 1998.
Similarly, Hadad et al. (2011) investigates the impact of Asian crisis and several regulatory
changes in Indonesian banking system concluding that the regulatory changes mitigate the
role of depositors in disciplining the banks.
These papers provided varied evidences about the impact of past crises on depositor
discipline. Although the evidences are quite mix to conclude about the implications of a
crisis on the behavior of depositors, we notice that papers in the literature also do not shed
light on the recent crisis episode. Macroprudential policies regularly implemented after
2008 might have significantly altered the way the crises impact depositor discipline. The
crisis itself might have sensitized the depositors against deteriorating bank risk (wake-up
call), however the macroprudential policies might be successful in alleviating the vul-
nerability among depositors. How this opposite factors function during and aftermath of
the 2008 crisis remains unanswered.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
In this study, the sample is a collection of an unbalanced panel of 40 Turkish commercial
banks and the data is gathered from the various issues of Banks in Turkey published by the
Banks Association of Turkey. This sample is composed of quarterly data from 2003:1 to
2014:2. We also include the five Islamic (participation2 banks since it is found that
depositor discipline is also operational among Islamic banks (Aysan et al., 2015a). Twenty-
one banks are domestically-owned commercial banks where more than 50% of their shares
are owned by Turkish residents, and three are classified as state-owned banks where the
majority stakes belong to the state. We do not analyze investment and development banks
since they do not collect deposits.
Table 2 reports the variables used in the analysis, their definitions and summary sta-
tistics. Bank risk indicators, deposit growth figures and deposit interest rates are presented
on two categories defined as pre- and post-crisis periods. This separation allows us to
understand the trajectories the main variables follow after the implementation of macro-
prudential policies in the post-crisis period. We expect that macroprudential polices can be
considered as successful if they curtail the adverse effects of expansionary crisis effects. At
first glance, the deposit growth rate, “Deposit_growth” before the implementation of
macroprudential policies is 5.2% on average. This figure drops to 3.4% after the imple-
mentation of the policies. About 1.8% deceleration on deposit growth mimics that
depositors became more cautious after the crisis that implies the macroprudential policies
have been limited on its expected balancing role. The deposit rates, “Deposit_rate”, on the
other hand, calculated as the quarterly expenditures for bank deposits to total deposits is
2 In Turkey, Islamic banks carry the name of “participation banks”. Although the operation practices are totally the same in
other Islamic bank practices, the name of participation recalls equity based financing through which customers participate in
risk and reward.
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2.3% on average. This figure almost halves and falls to 1.2% after macroprudential policies
were implemented in the post-crisis period. This reduction in deposit rates gives an im-
pression that banks have not been eager to attract depositors with higher interest rates.
Interestingly, the risk indicators, “Equity”, “Liquidity” and “Loan_quality”, remain almost
unchanged, giving an indication that bank fundamentals were not affected by the global
crisis.
4. Empirical Strategy
We build an empirical strategy to test the presence of depositor discipline in Turkish market
before and after the global financial crisis. This strategy would also yield whether or not a
rich set of macroprudential policies in the country have affected depositor discipline. As in
most similar studies, we estimate both quantity and interest rate responses to bank risk
fundamentals. Only by considering the joint estimation we can understand how depositors
react to changing bank risk and how banks react to deposit withdrawals. The joint esti-
mation in fact enables us to differentiate between deposit supply and demand shifts (e.g.,
Ioannidou and de Dreu, 2006; Karas et al., 2013). A positive association between banks
risk and deposit rates might be the outcome of an aggressive strategy to attract deposits.
The intention to attract more deposits, to meet risky loan demand for instance, can push
banks to raise their deposit rates. This demand would, however, be revealed by the quantity
regression, where the relation between bank risk and deposit quantity would also be
positive in case of a demand effect.
We begin with a traditional test for the existence of depositor discipline till the im-
plementation of the 2008 crisis. Then, we examine in which direction the depositor dis-
cipline has evolved in the post-crisis period. In doing so, we also seek the answer whether
or not macroprudential policies achieved to mitigate the possible adverse impact of the
crisis on depositors. We examine the impact of the 2008 crisis both on depositors’ mon-
itoring incentives and banks’ responses. We also observe how bank type influences de-
positor discipline.
4.1. Depositors’ monitoring
The 2008 crisis could have remarkably altered the functioning of depositor discipline. Yet,
it is blurred how depositors behave in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. On the one hand,
increased risk perception arising from the 2008 crisis may amplify vulnerability of
depositors through their deposit amounts. Capital flows to emerging markets may incur the
risk-taking incentives of the banks which could then trigger the disciplining role of
depositors. On the other hand, macroprudential policies may wipe out the impact of these
expansionary policies and reduce banks’ incentives to risk-taking which in turn would play
a rebalancing role to sustain depositor discipline. On purely theoretical grounds, it is
difficult to forecast which of these effects are stronger for the quantity responses of
depositors. However, it is more straightforward that during the 2008 crisis the vulnerability
of depositors to bank risk indicators differed from that of during pre-crisis periods.
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4.2. Banks’ responses
Banks’ incentives to manage deposits through interest rates may differentiate during pre-
and post-crisis. While we expect that depositor discipline is operational through quantity
and interest rate basis, this mutually working mechanism may not work properly in periods
with relatively tranquil and abundant liquidity conditions. A reasonable possibility is that
while depositors punish their banks for deteriorating bank fundamentals during the pre-
crisis, banks may remain reluctant to offer higher rates to hold their depositors. This is
because banks’ leverages before the crisis were relatively low during the pre-crisis in
Turkish banking system. However, owing partly to external funding opportunities, banks’
willingness to lend (risk-taking) has improved considerably in the post-crisis period.
Figures 1 and 2 plot deposits to assets and external funds to assets during pre- and post-
crisis periods, respectively. The charts present the simple fits of these ratios across time.
The fitted values in Figure 1 show that deposits to assets ratio has in-decline trend during
the sample period. A noteworthy sign is the steeper trend during the post-crisis that is
calculated for all the banks in the banking system. Figure 1 confirms that banks are mildly
dependent on deposits implying the presence of other sources of funds flowing to banks
(Aysan et al., 2015b).
Figure 2 supports the information depicted in Figure 1. External funding of the banks in
Turkish banking system, in the form of various borrowings (repo, securitization, syndi-
cation, bond issuance, etc.), relative to their total assets has been declining before the
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Figure 1. Deposits to Assets Ratios during Pre- and Post-Crisis Periods
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outbreak of 2008. In the aftermath of the crisis, however, the trend is upward confirming
that capital inflows have diversified and enriched the funding sources of the banks in the
post-crisis period.
The increasing trend in external funding has an alarming signal and emphasizes the
need for careful monitoring against the possibility of the build-up of asset bubbles in
Turkish markets. It can be argued that banks do not necessarily need to attract depositors in
the post-crisis since external funding would compensate any withdrawal. Nonetheless,
banks will opt to keep up good relations with their depositors in order not to lose its
depositor base.
4.3. The impact of bank type
Depositors may think that there exists an implicit guarantee for state-owned banks that
could weaken the depositor discipline mechanism. Moreover, it is found that depositor
discipline works differently in Islamic banks. We hypothesize that depositor discipline is
weaker among state-owned banks. Yet, we consider that Islamic bank depositors are more
responsive to bank risk indicators as found in an earlier study (Aysan et al., 2015a).
Against this backdrop, the following reduced-form quantity and interest rate depositor
discipline models are estimated for the whole sample and for the two subsamples of
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pre- and post-crisis periods:
Depositgrowthi, t ¼ α1x, i, t þ α11  Xi, t1 þ α12  Ci, t1 þ "1i þ θ 1t þ 1i, t; ð1Þ
Depositratei, t ¼ α2x, i, t þ α21  Xi, t1 þ α22  Ci, t1 þ "2i þ θ 2t þ 2i, t ð2Þ
where the X-vector represents bank risk indicators that might be of interest to depositors
concerned about bank safety. This vector contains capitalization (“Equity”), bank liquidity
conditions (“Liquidity”) and loan quality (“Loan_quality”). These variables are included
with one-quarter lag to account for the publication delay. The “Equity” variable is mea-
sured as the book value of equity to total assets excluding fixed assets. The “Liquidity” and
“Loan_quality” variables are calculated as liquid assets to deposits and the ratio of non-
performing loans to gross loans, respectively. Under these specifications, it is expected that
bank depositors tend to withdraw their deposits with lower capitalization, poorer liquidity
conditions and deteriorating loan quality.
The C-vector contains other bank-specific controls potentially affecting the reaction
variables. As a measure for bank size, the “Bank_size” represents the variable as the
natural logarithm of total assets. We define “Bank_age” as the natural logarithm of quarter-
years to control for institutional maturity. We also account for the bank outreach across the
country with the number of bank branches “Branch_coverage”. This variable is also de-
fined as the natural logarithm of total number of branches. This can be an important factor
in depositor discipline since it can be argued that the number of bank branches facilitate
depositors to withdraw or deposit their money.
The reaction variables are the traditional measures used in the depositor discipline
literature. The dependent variable in Equation (1) (“Deposit_growth”) is the first difference
of the log of deposits for bank i during the period t, and the dependent variable in
Equation (2) (“Deposit_rate”) is the quarterly expenses for bank deposits divided by total
deposits for bank i during the period t. We estimate a model using bank fixed effects, i.e.,
"1i and "
2
i , both for the quantity and deposit rate regressions to control for unobserved
characteristics across banks. Furthermore, in all specifications, we include quarter dummy
variables to account for nation-wide shocks and other quarter-specific events that might
influence the interest rates, i.e., θ 1t and θ
2
t . In these regressions 
1
i, t and 
2
i, t denote for the
error terms.
5. Findings and Discussions
Table 3 presents the results from the quantity and deposit rate regressions. Columns (1)–(3)
exhibit the estimation results of quantity equation (see Equation (1)), whereas columns
(4)–(6) refer to the estimation results of deposit rate equation (see Equation (2)). To test
whether our results are robust to alternative sample compositions for each equation, we
produce three sets of estimates. In doing so, we observe the degree to which depositors
exercise different discipline. Columns (1) and (4) report the results for all banks with
different ownership types. In columns (2) and (5), we exclude Islamic banks since
the operative conditions and risk-free banking might enable different depositor discipline
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(see Aysan et al., 2015b). The last columns (3) and (6) exclude state-owned banks since
they provide depositors weaker incentives for monitoring and disciplining (Caprio and
Honohan, 2004). We first estimate the presence of depositor discipline in the Turkish
banking system for the whole sample. Then we estimate this relation for the pre- and post-
crisis periods to observe how depositor discipline evolved during post-crisis.
Table 3. Tests for Market Discipline: Full Sample Period 2003Q1–2014Q2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deposit_growth Deposit_growth Deposit_growth Deposit_rate Deposit_rate Deposit_rate
Equity 0.9561*** 1.0519*** 0.9731*** 0.0104 0.0109 0.0099
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.128) (0.141) (0.168)
Liquidity 0.0391*** 0.0403*** 0.0396*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Loan_quality 0.1440 0.1559 0.1844 0.0135* 0.0138* 0.0066
(0.305) (0.283) (0.302) (0.100) (0.088) (0.393)
Bank_size 0.1475*** 0.1804*** 0.1475*** 0.0025** 0.0023* 0.0024**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.028) (0.085) (0.050)
Bank_age 0.0615 0.0257 0.0615 0.0077 0.0070 0.0034
(0.462) (0.749) (0.542) (0.101) (0.182) (0.435)
Branch_coverage 0.0172 0.0114 0.0170 0.0004 0.0007 0.0006
(0.306) (0.522) (0.308) (0.755) (0.614) (0.636)
Constant 1.1584* 1.6476*** 1.1352 0.0465** 0.0137 0.0214
(0.057) (0.004) (0.104) (0.044) (0.599) (0.297)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-owned banks Yes Yes – Yes Yes –
Private-owned banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Participation banks Yes – Yes Yes – Yes
Observations 1,456 1,292 1,323 1,456 1,292 1,323
R-squared 0.148 0.155 0.152 0.602 0.618 0.549
Number of banks 40 35 37 40 35 37
Notes: The table reports the full sample estimates in the time dimension covering the period 2003Q1–2012Q4.
The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is “Deposit_growth”, which is calculated as the log transformation
of the ratio of deposit amounts for consecutive years. The dependent variable in columns (4)–(6) is
“Deposit_rate”, which is calculated as the quarterly deposit expenses divided by total bank deposits. The bank
fundamentals are represented by “Equity”, “Liquidity” and “Loan_quality”. “Equity” denotes the book value
of equity to total assets excluding fixed assets. “Liquidity” is equal to liquid assets to total deposits.
“Loan_quality” is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. The control-vector contains “Bank_size”,
“Bank_age” and “Branch_coverage”. “Bank_size” variable is computed as the log transformation of total
assets. “Bank_age” variable is the natural logarithm of quarter-years the bank operates in the country. To test
whether bank type is important in depositor discipline, for each equation we produce three sets of estimates:
Columns (1) and (4) report the results for all banks with different ownership types; in columns (2) and (5), we
exclude Islamic (participation) banks; in columns (3) and (6), we exclude state-owned banks. Quarter-year
dummy variables are included in all specifications but their coefficient estimates are not reported. The re-
gression method is fixed effect estimator with heteroskedasticity and within-panel serial correlation robust
standard errors. The p-values shown in parentheses. *** indicates the 1% significance level, ** for 5% level
and * for 10% level, respectively.
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The estimation results in Table 3 confirm that there exists depositor discipline in the
Turkish banking system. This finding does not vary across different bank compositions.
Except for loan quality, the coefficients of bank risk variables do have the expected signs.
This is possible due to relatively low level of non-performing loans in the Turkish banking
system even in the aftermath of the crisis. The regression results suggest that depositors
monitor their banks against their poor performance and withdraw their money as a pun-
ishment. Banks also try to attract withdrawn deposit by offering higher rates. The adverse
liquidity shocks especially instigate banks to increase their rates. Regarding the equity
shocks, the impact is insignificant but with expected sign.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for the quantity and deposit rate regressions for the
pre- and post-crisis periods, respectively, to observe the possible change in depositor
discipline. The findings by splitting the sample as pre- and post-crisis suggest that
depositors become more vulnerable to poor bank performance. The parameter estimates for
bank risk variables indicate stricter punishment in the post-crisis period. This implies that
depositors’ perceptions of bank risk become more sensitive in the post-crisis period.3
Prior to the outbreak of the 2008 crisis, the estimation results yield that depositors were
mildly responsive to bank capitalization and liquidity conditions (“Equity”, “Liquidity”).4
The outbreak of the crisis has augmented depositors’ responses. This implies that the intro-
duction of macroprudential measures made a signaling effect about the banking system’s
vulnerability, making the depositors more vigilant towards bank risk, and therefore, we
consider this finding as supportive to regulatory actions in preserving financial stability.
The results of the deposit rate equations presented in Table 5 suggest that banks are not
eager to attract deposit against withdrawals in the pre-crisis period. However, banks tend to
attract depositors during the post-crisis even though they have found ampler external
funding. The full functioning of depositor discipline mechanism during the post-crisis
period under more funding opportunities warns against excessive risk-taking or build-up of
asset bubbles. This possibility also indicates that macroprudential policies have been in-
sufficient to completely wipe out bank related concerns. This may be the evidence that
when markets are at buoyant condition, banks can compensate the withdrawal of deposit
with other sources of funds.
We observe that depositors’ vulnerability to bank risk changes with the variation of the
sample composition. Specifically, market discipline becomes more marked with different
sample bundles. When state-owned banks are excluded from the sample, the degree of
disciplining remains almost unchanged rejecting the loose depositor discipline among
state-owned banks. As to whether Islamic depositors were more or less sensitive to bank
capitalization than conventional depositors, the evidence suggests that quantity vulnera-
bility to bank risk indicators is less among Islamic bank depositors, even less than state-
owned banks. This can be the possible outcome of dual depositor insurance scheme in the
3We test the equality of parameter estimates that are generated from two different regressions, estimated on two different
samples. The test results suggest statistically significant difference which allows us to interpret on the value of regression
coefficients, i.e., varying depositor vulnerability. These test results are available upon request from the authors.
4Quantity disciplining is not functional on non-performing loans. This might be the direct result of less concern put on low
non-performing loans in Turkish banking system. This was also evident in the whole sample.
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Turkish banking system till 2006. Aysan et al. (2015a) argue that the dual insurance
scheme might have given an impression to Islamic bank depositors that the Islamic in-
surance motivated mutual supervision among Islamic banks.5 The overall regression results
Table 4. Regression Results for Deposit Growth during Pre- and Post-Crisis Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post_crisis Pre_crisis Post_crisis Pre_crisis Post_crisis Pre_crisis
Equity 2.4678*** 1.1512*** 2.4876*** 1.2874*** 2.4849*** 1.1830***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Liquidity 0.0688*** 0.0588*** 0.0690*** 0.0609*** 0.0691*** 0.0594***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Loan_quality 1.2757* 0.0066 1.2981* 0.0062 1.2843* 0.0133
(0.064) (0.961) (0.068) (0.965) (0.064) (0.934)
Bank_size 0.3647*** 0.1427** 0.3672*** 0.1953*** 0.3705*** 0.1437**
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.013)
Bank_age 0.0118 0.2332* 0.1094 0.0973 0.1192 0.2459*
(0.968) (0.059) (0.723) (0.364) (0.741) (0.060)
Branch_coverage 0.0463 0.0063 0.0495 0.0227 0.0486 0.0071
(0.470) (0.836) (0.460) (0.448) (0.462) (0.818)
Constant 3.3159** 0.3457 2.8459* 1.4187* 3.9145** 0.2458
(0.033) (0.635) (0.076) (0.053) (0.029) (0.718)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-owned banks Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Private-owned banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Participation banks Yes Yes – – Yes Yes
Observations 551 905 503 789 497 826
R-squared 0.267 0.192 0.270 0.202 0.270 0.199
Number of banks 34 39 30 34 31 36
Notes: The table reports the regression results for the pre- and post-crisis periods. The pre-crisis years include
the years before 2009 and post-crisis year include the years till the end of 2012. The dependent variable is
“Deposit_growth”, which is calculated as the log transformation of the ratio of deposit amounts for consecutive
years. The bank fundamentals are represented by “Equity”, “Liquidity” and “Loan_quality”. “Equity” denotes
the book value of equity to total assets excluding fixed assets. “Liquidity” is equal to liquid assets to total
deposits. “Loan_quality” is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. The control-vector contains
“Bank_size”, “Bank_age” and “Branch_coverage”. “Bank_size” variable is computed as the log transformation
of total assets. “Bank_age” variable is the natural logarithm of quarter-years the bank operates in the country.
To test whether bank type is important in depositor discipline, for each equation we produce three sets of
estimates: Columns (1) and (2) report the results for all banks with different ownership types; in columns (3)
and (4), we exclude Islamic (participation) banks; in columns (5) and (6), we exclude state-owned banks.
Quarter-year dummy variables are included in all specifications but their coefficient estimates are not reported.
The regression method is fixed effect estimator with heteroskedasticity and within-panel serial correlation
robust standard errors. The p-values shown in parentheses. *** indicates the 1% significance level, ** for 5%
level and for 10% level, respectively.
5Please see Aysan et al., 2015b, about the details of dual deposit insurance scheme in Turkey till 2006.
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are robust to different bank risk definitions. We tried several other variables to proxy for
bank risk as shown in Table 6, we obtained very similar results confirming the findings.
This study has studied the nexus between macroprudential policies and depositor
discipline in an emerging market country during a crisis period but in a relatively
Table 5. Regression Results for Deposit Rate during Pre- and Post-Crisis Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post_crisis Pre_crisis Post_crisis Pre_crisis Post_crisis Pre_crisis
Equity 0.0126*** 0.0145 0.0130*** 0.0151 0.0127*** 0.0146
(0.010) (0.147) (0.007) (0.156) (0.010) (0.140)
Liquidity 0.0004*** 0.0005 0.0004*** 0.0005 0.0004*** 0.0004
(0.002) (0.148) (0.001) (0.129) (0.002) (0.184)
Loan_quality 0.0013 0.0128 0.0020 0.0132 0.0013 0.0065
(0.859) (0.118) (0.798) (0.105) (0.861) (0.452)
Bank_size 0.0003 0.0017 0.0004 0.0013 0.0004 0.0013
(0.824) (0.304) (0.817) (0.497) (0.778) (0.433)
Bank_age 0.0053 0.0137* 0.0016 0.0107 0.0086 0.0102
(0.614) (0.090) (0.883) (0.223) (0.471) (0.231)
Branch_coverage 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0002 0.0006 0.0001
(0.642) (0.730) (0.607) (0.888) (0.621) (0.957)
Constant 0.0402 0.0704* 0.0222 0.0269 0.0561 0.0232
(0.483) (0.068) (0.723) (0.537) (0.373) (0.533)
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-owned banks Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
Private-owned banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign-owned banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Participation banks Yes Yes – – Yes Yes
Observations 551 905 503 789 497 826
R-squared 0.314 0.439 0.326 0.475 0.304 0.374
Number of banks 34 39 30 34 31 36
Notes: The table reports the regression results for the pre- and post-crisis periods. The pre-crisis years include
the years before 2009 and post-crisis year include the years till the end of 2012. The dependent variable is
“Deposit_rate”, which is calculated as the quarterly deposit expenses divided by total bank deposits. The bank
fundamentals are represented by “Equity”, “Liquidity” and “Loan_quality”. “Equity” denotes the book value
of equity to total assets excluding fixed assets. “Liquidity” is equal to liquid assets to total deposits.
“Loan_quality” is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. The control-vector contains “Bank_size”,
“Bank_age” and “Branch_coverage”. “Bank_size” variable is computed as the log transformation of total
assets. “Bank_age” variable is the natural logarithm of quarter-years the bank operates in the country. To test
whether bank type is important in depositor discipline, for each equation we produce three sets of estimates:
Columns (1) and (2) report the results for all banks with different ownership types; in columns (3) and (4), we
exclude Islamic (participation) banks; in columns (5) and (6), we exclude state-owned banks. Quarter-year
dummy variables are included in all specifications but their coefficient estimates are not reported. The re-
gression method is fixed effect estimator with heteroskedasticity and within-panel serial correlation robust
standard errors. The p-values shown in parentheses. *** indicates the 1% significance level, ** for 5% level
and * for 10% level, respectively.
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capital-abundant environment. The results suggested a stronger monitoring from depositors
and significant responses from banks during the post-crisis period which have been in-
significant during the pre-crisis period. The results may prima facie seem interesting since
banks have found increasing amount of external funding in the post-crisis period. This
suggests that riskier banks respond significantly to depositors’ punishment even though
they can support their liabilities with external funds. However, this relationship does not
hold during the pre-crisis when banks’ lending momentum was relatively low and when
they were less able to displace deposits with external funds. When banks pursue more
aggressive lending policies during the post-crisis period, they also follow aggressive
strategy toward deposits even though external funds are enough to compensate displaced
deposits. These results are also confirmed by the pattern deposits to assets and external
funds to assets ratios followed during the sample period. The bold evidence in this study
suggests that the implementation of macroprudential tools seem to have a positive impact
on financial stability, since regulatory supervision is more firmly assisted by the market in
the post-crisis period.
6. Concluding Remarks
Market discipline has the potential role for maintaining financial stability by partly
transferring the monitoring responsibility to depositors. It may encourage banks to aug-
ment the capital base and hold safer asset portfolio. Although the impacts of various types
of crisis within the context of depositor discipline are examined, the impact of the 2008
crisis still needs a comprehensive research. The implementation of various expansionary
fiscal and monetary measures in advanced countries has resulted in massive capital flows to
emerging countries. Many emerging countries had a solid stance to mitigate the adverse
impact of these inflows via various macroprudential policies. However, there is an active
controversy on the success of these policies. In this study, we examined the impact of
macroprudential policies from the perspective of depositors. In particular, we studied the
degree to which macroprudential policies have changed depositors’ sensitivities to bank
risks.
From the perspective of supplementing regulatory discipline with depositor discipline in
emerging economies, our results present a successful exercise in Turkey between 2003Q1
and 2014Q2. We find that successful experience is mainly driven by the robust depositor
Table 6. Alternative Bank Risk Indicators
Variable Definition
Equity – Book value of equity to total assets
Liquidity – Liquid assets to total assets
– Loan loss provisions to gross loans
Loan_quality – Non-performing loans to total assets
Notes: The table shows the alternative bank risk indicators
used for robustness checks.
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discipline in the post-crisis period. Before the outbreak of the 2008 crisis, we find that
depositors exercised disciplining through the volume of deposits, but banks did not sig-
nificantly respond to displaced deposits through the interest rate mechanism. The post-
crisis period experience suggests that depositors’ vulnerability to bank risk gets more
sensitive after 2008 with the activation of interest rates to bank risk. We highlighted that
depositors’ vulnerability did not stem from significant deterioration during the post-crisis
period since bank risk indicators did not demonstrate significant variation during pre- and
post-crisis periods.
From the perspective of financial stability, depositor discipline worked as functional,
even when the banking system was buoyant with external funds. This showed that banks
tried to attract depositors through offering higher deposit rates even though external funds
supported their funding level.
In this study, we also found evidence that depositor discipline varies across different
bank types. State-owned bank depositors appear to exercise similar discipline on their
banks than their private counterparts. Moreover, Islamic bank depositors exercised a more
loose discipline in the country, probably due to different insurance schemes in the country
till 2006.
Although this study’s aim was to verify the impact of macroprudential period on
depositor discipline, for future research, it would be interesting to verify whether the
endorsement of various macroprudential measures is in conflict with the increase in de-
posit–insurance coverage. Furthermore, the chronological indexations of macroprudential
policies in this study can provide us additional insights about the magnitude of market
discipline.
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